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 Managing major societal risks involves the need to understand public risk responses. 
 The social amplification of risk framework has been our main theoretical approach. 
 We explore how to model endogenised risk observation, behaviour and  communication. 
 Agent simulation shows characteristic outcomes like peaks and drift in risk beliefs. 
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Abstract 
A characteristic aspect of risks in a complex, modern society is the nature and degree of the 
public response – sometimes significantly at variance with objective assessments of risk. A large 
part of the risk management task involves anticipating, explaining and reacting to this response. 
One of the main approaches we have for analysing the emergent public response, the social 
amplification of risk framework, has been the subject of little modelling. The purpose of this 
paper is to explore how social risk amplification can be represented and simulated. The 
importance of heterogeneity among risk perceivers, and the role of their social networks in 
shaping risk perceptions, makes it natural to take an agent-based approach. We look in particular 
at how to model some central aspects of many risk events: the way actors come to observe other 
actors more than external events in forming their risk perceptions; the way in which behaviour 
both follows risk perception and shapes it; and the way risk communications are fashioned in the 
light of responses to previous communications. We show how such aspects can be represented by 
availability cascades, but also how this creates further problems of how to represent the 
contrasting effects of informational and reputational elements, and the differentiation of private 
and public risk beliefs. Simulation of the resulting model shows how certain qualitative aspects 
of risk response time series found empirically – such as endogenously-produced peaks in risk 
concern – can be explained by this model.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Managing the major risks experienced by a complex society – the risks of epidemic disease, 
climate change, food and drug contamination, the catastrophic failure of hazardous installations 
and so on – almost invariably involves managing public anxiety or public complacency as well 
as containing physical threat (Leiss, 2001). Not only are public perceptions pivotal in shaping 
public behaviour, and therefore exposure to the threat, but characteristically produce further 
risks. A recent analysis of the Fukushima nuclear power accident argued that: 
‘There was a rushed evacuation response to the accident… this evacuation actually led to 
more premature deaths, by a factor of at least ten, than it gave protection from radiation… 
The reaction was driven to a large extent by the public’s sense of the scale of the hazard, 
which was not close to the reality of the risk… The studies of many previous accidents 
have come to a similar conclusion. Even for an accident as significant as Chernobyl it can 
be shown that the vast majority of the public health impacts are caused by mental stress 
relating to the fear of the event, rather than the effects caused by the amount of ionising 
radiation released...’ (Cahart, 2013). 
Thus public risk perceptions have often mattered more than objective assessments of risk, as 
seen in such celebrated cases as Love Canal, Alar and TWA 800 in the US (Kuran and Sunstein, 
1999) and the Sudan 1 and Hatfield scandals in the UK (Busby and Alcock, 2008). It has become 
essential for organizational decision making to be founded on an understanding of societal risk 
responses, and for decision makers to theorise, however loosely, about how such responses arise. 
 The formation of these responses has a number of defining features. Most if not all of the 
public, and many managers, have no first-hand technical knowledge of the risk and rely on other 
social actors – including the media – of whom they are often sceptical if not cynical (Petts and 
Niemeyer, 2004). These actors in turn generally have a clear appreciation of this cynicism and 
anticipate it in the way they act and communicate (Busby and Duckett, 2012). The responses of a 
wide range of actors, including risk managers and the general public, typically influence the 
character of the threat and the risk bearers’ exposure to it (Busby and Onggo, 2013). Responses 
are shaped by the way in which such groups inter-communicate within their social networks 
(Scherer and Cho, 2003). And the responses become events in their own right, to which social 














Credible models of social risk responses need to incorporate such features. They need to 
endogenise observation, representing the way in which actors, despite their heterogeneity, often 
base their own responses in part on how they see peers or neighbours responding, not on direct 
experience or knowledge of the risk. They need to endogenise behaviour, representing the way 
actors adapt their behaviour to changing observations of a risk, thus changing their exposure and 
the risk itself, and thereby also changing subsequent perceptions of this risk. And they need to 
endogenise risk communication, representing the way actors base their risk perceptions on the 
communications of others whose apparent biases they correct for, but who in turn can anticipate 
such corrections in formulating their communications. Yet, as Rahmandad and Sterman (2008) 
point out, we typically model disease outbreaks as though contact rates were fixed, ignoring the 
way people change their behaviour as prevalence grows. And, as Busby and Onggo (2013) 
argue, we have typically ignored the way in which actors communicating about risk anticipate 
each other’s biases, and even anticipate the anticipation of each other’s biases. The aims of this 
paper are to explore how an agent based model can incorporate these characteristics, to explore 
what we can say about model validity, and to explore what quantities need to be known in order 
to parameterise such a model.    
Our main theoretical foundation for doing this is the ‘social amplification of risk 
framework’ (Kasperson et al, 1988). The development of this framework followed earlier lines of 
work on individual risk perception (broadly starting with Fischhoff et al, 1978), and on cultural 
risk selection (broadly starting with Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). It has probably been the only 
mainstream attempt to try to synthesise this prior work, to deal with social emergence and to 
capture the importance of social communication in explaining risk behaviour (Renn, 1991). 
Much empirical work on risk responses in various domains, ranging from nuclear waste to 
terrorism, has been done under the heading of social risk amplification. But, as we attempt to 
show in the next section, the social amplification of risk remains largely un-modelled and under-
specified. This means that various empirical findings that have emerged over the last 25 years 
remain ambiguous, and the implications for decision makers unclear.  
There are several observations in the literature that motivate the use of agent models in 
particular. First, in the social risk amplification framework, risk has been seen as first and 
foremost a matter of social communication (Luhmann, 1993; Renn, 1991). The essence of the 














social actors, and communication about the risk then spreads through a system of heterogeneous 
actors  seen as ‘amplification stations’ (Kasperson et al, 1988). Second, empirical work – notably 
Scherer and Cho’s (2003) article and more recently Muter et al’s (2013) in the risk literature, but 
also work such as that of Kohler et al (2007) in the demography literature – has shown how 
important social interactions are in the development of risk perceptions. An individual’s risk 
beliefs tend to be strongly correlated to those of others with close social connections, and 
individuals’ reports tend to acknowledge how those others have influenced them. Third, non-
linearities are central to how risk amplification arises. Some of the few prior attempts at 
modelling risk amplification (Burns and Slovic, 2007; Busby and Onggo, 2012) have shown how 
complex are the feedback loops between the perceptions, behaviours and communications among 
the different actors in a risk issue, making analytical modelling infeasible. Fourth, the actors 
respond heterogeneously. Much of the later work on individual risk perception (for example 
Marris et al 1997, Langford et al 1999) has stressed individual differences. And individual risk 
sensitivity (Sjoeberg, 2000) has been an important explanatory variable for differences in 
individual risk perception. This all strongly points to agent-based modelling as the appropriate 
medium for modelling social risk amplification.  
In this article we first review the literature on social risk amplification in an attempt to 
draw out the main theoretical and empirical contributions that have arisen since it was first 
proposed. We then describe the construction of a model, justifying its content by reference to the 
literature. We base this model on Kuran and Sunstein’s (1999) account of availability cascades, 
and show how we can model central aspects of such cascades – particularly the ideas that 
individuals have both espoused and expressed risk beliefs, that they have both informational and 
reputational reasons for responding to beliefs common in a social discourse, and that there are 
availability ‘entrepreneurs’ who knowingly exploit the possibility of such cascades. We present 
typical results of simulating the model, and we discuss issues of model validity by reference to 
empirical work on time series of risk perceptions and concerns in the literature. We conclude 


















2  Literature review 
 
The social amplification of risk framework (SARF) was first proposed by Kasperson et al (1988) 
as a way explaining the often apparently mistaken responses of populations to risks in modern 
society. The original framework was intended to show ‘that risk events interact with 
psychological, social, and cultural processes in ways that can heighten or attenuate public 
perceptions of risk and related risk behaviours’. And it stressed the ‘ripple’ effects through which 
risk perceptions led people to behave in ways that created secondary impacts beyond the harmful 
effects of the original risk. Generally, it has been applied to study excessively high rather than 
excessively low risk perceptions, although the need for symmetry has long been recognised (Rip, 
1988).  
It has been used in a wide variety of contexts, including wildfire risk (Brenkert-Smith et 
al, 2013), the siting of potentially hazardous installations (Binder et al, 2011), environmental risk 
from tunneling (Chung, 2011), disease outbreaks (Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009, Raude et al, 2004, 
Busby and Duckett, 2012), genetically modified foods (Frewer et al, 2002), the dismantling of 
hazardous installations (Bakir, 2005), chemical accidents (Porto and de Freitas, 1996), climate 
change (Renn, 2011), nuclear weapons facility accidents (Metz, 1996), inoculation risks (Petts 
and Niemeyer, 2004) and general levels of violence in society (Hill, 2001). In such situations, the 
framework has provided a way of describing how discrepancies between the risk beliefs of 
different groups, and between experts and lay communities especially, can arise. 
The methods used in such studies have been wide-ranging. Some are qualitative, 
analyzing rich verbal accounts among the public from interviews (for example Masuda and 
Garvin, 2006) and discussion groups (Petts and Niemeyer, 2004; Busby and Duckett, 2012), or 
analysing media content (Bakir, 2005). These have revealed how the worldview of individuals 
affects their tendency to amplify risk, and how particular actors use the media to convey their 
view of the risk and influence opinion. Quantitative studies have occasionally used economic 
measures of risk responses, such as property values and business activity (Metz, 1996), and there 
has been some content analysis of the news media (Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009). But most 
quantitative work has been based on public surveys (for example Brenkert-Smith et al, 2013; 
Binder et al, 2011, Frewer et al, 2002). These are generally directed at the public, but some 














dealing with a potential disease outbreak (Raude et al, 2004). Surveys have generally been 
analysed by regressing risk perceptions, and sometimes amplified risk perceptions, against 
expected correlates. These include types of information source and social interaction (Brenkert-
Smith et al, 2013), attitudes of support or hostility toward a technology (Binder et al, 2011), 
engagement in public meetings (McComas, 2003) and the volume of reporting (Frewer et al, 
2002). Occasional studies have also looked at the covariation of behavioural changes, such as 
consumption of foods thought to carry disease, with risk perception (Raude et al, 2004). 
Mostly these studies use data suggesting the presence of risk amplification, but Lewis and 
Tyshenko (2009) and Metz (1996) both found expected amplification not to be present, and so 
were primarily concerned with correlating the absence of risk amplification with specific 
circumstances. Some of the more ambitious studies of social risk amplification, attempting to 
develop a comprehensive view of the factors causing amplification, have had to use mixed 
methods. Burns et al (1993) in particular needed a combination of public survey, expert ratings, a 
Delphi panel and analysis of media attention to develop structural equations linking risk 
amplification to physical risk and social processes. Both they, and subsequently Freudenberg 
(2003), emphasized the importance of perceived managerial incompetence or misconduct in 
amplifying public risk perceptions. 
However, a basic limitation of this empirical work is its concentration on the statistical 
correlates of amplification, rather than the mechanism that produces it. The core of social risk 
amplification in Kasperson et al’s (1988) original formulation is a mechanism rather than a law 
linking structural variables. The kind of modelling that explicitly represents this mechanism has 
been very limited to date. There has been some systems dynamics work, based on the 
observation that social risk amplification involves complex feedback loops connecting risk 
responses with decisions and behaviours that in turn modify risk and the perceptions of risk. 
Burns and Slovic (2007) modelled public perception and amplification of terrorism risk, while 
Busby and Onggo (2013) recently modelled socially amplified public responses to zoonotic 
disease outbreaks. But these studies assumed essentially homogenous populations. As suggested 
earlier, social risk amplification was from the start conceived as a communications phenomenon 
taking place in a network of 'amplification stations' of different kinds. And more recent work on 
risk perception (Scherer and Cho, 2003; Muter et al, 2013) has shown empirically that 














seems essential that modelling should involve heterogeneous agents interacting within a social 
network. 
There have also been some basic criticisms of the social risk amplification framework 
itself. In particular, Rayner (1988) argued that the concept naively assumed risks to exist 
objectively. The criterion for testing whether risk was amplified at any time was whether social 
beliefs were greater than the objective level. Rayner argued that risks do not exist outside the 
social system, and those with the expertise to have the most complete and accurate understanding 
of a risk were still social actors, subject to social processes. A recent study (Busby and Duckett, 
2012) made an attempt to deal with this. It involved an empirical analysis of how people form 
beliefs about distortions in the risk beliefs of others. Most people have to get their information 
about societal risks from other social actors, rather than direct experience. But, while relying on 
other actors, they also anticipate how their views might be biased. Some earlier studies pointed 
in the same direction. For example, Petts and Niemeyer (2004) referred to how people expect the 
news media to exaggerate risks knowingly. Frewer (2004) argued that people correct and even 
over-correct for the biases they expect in sources of information that promote their own vested 
interests (see also Frewer et al, 2003). And Renn and Levine (1991) claim that information 
receivers by default tend to assume that risk communicators are trying to deceive their audience. 
Modelling risk amplification should therefore represent not just actors communicating risk 
beliefs to each other, but actors mutually theorising about and compensating for each other’s 
apparent biases. 
We therefore argue that there are several important reasons for modelling social risk 
amplification generally, and for using agent based modelling specifically. The general 
justification for using agent based modelling is that it is, as Axelrod (1997: 3) has suggested, ‘a 
third way of doing science' - not proving theorems but making inductions from what are 
effectively thought experiments. Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999: 5) suggest that building simple 
simulation models is valuable both as a process of formalizing social theory and discovering its 
consequences in an artificial society. Computational agent-based models have a specific 
relevance because ‘the consequences of adaptive processes are often very hard to deduce when 
there are many interacting agents following rules that have non-linear effects...’ (Axelrod,1997: 
4). They are especially appropriate for studying processes that lack central coordination (Macy 














relevant to the behaviour of a system as whole (Macal and North, 2010). Social risk 
amplification is a phenomenon in which heterogeneous agents are engaged in parallel processes 
without a well-defined order of action (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999: 6), and in which we cannot 
reasonably assume homogeneity and perfect mixing within compartments (Rahmandad and 
Sterman, 2008). Agent based modelling makes a commitment to methodological individualism, 
tracing all collective phenomena back to individuals but, as Epstein and Axtell (1996: 16) point 
out, it still allows emergent institutions to have feedback effects on individual agents. This, as we 
have suggested, is an important characteristic of social risk amplification. Although agent-based 
approaches appear not to have been used in the development and application of risk 
amplification, they have been reported in somewhat similar areas – for example the modelling of 
warning message dissemination through multiple channels (Nagarajan et al., 2012), the mutual 
influence of a society’s members on their choice of transport modes (Sunitiyoso and Matsumoto, 
2009), and the diffusion of new products (Amini et al, 2012)). 
In the agent model development that follows, we first deal with the core model of risk 
perceivers’ social interaction in Section 3. We then explore how to represent the role of 




3  The core process of availability and the endogeneity of risk observation 
 
The first key element is the proposition that social actors find out about a societal risk almost 
entirely from other actors, not from direct physical observation of experience.  The 
‘observations’ that shape risk beliefs, come from within the social system. Most obviously actors’ 
beliefs are shaped by those of their peers and a model therefore requires a commitment to a 
specific mechanism through which social actors interact. Our choice is to draw on Kuran and 
Sunstein’s (1999) notion of availability cascades, which itself derived from Kahnemann and 
Tverky’s (1972) work on the heuristics and biases that arise in human decision making under 
uncertainty. Kuran and Sunstein (1999) show that an expressed risk perception has increasing 
plausibility through rising availability in public discourse. They argue that, of all the cognitive 














in which people tend to form their risk judgments largely on the basis of information exchanged 
through a social process. Kuran and Sunstein’s framework contains several basic elements that 
need to be modelled: 1) people have internal or espoused beliefs; 2) people have external or 
expressed beliefs, which may differ from their espoused beliefs; 3) espoused beliefs are 
influenced by the availability of a risk perception in public discourse for informational reasons 
(they tell people something about the risk); 4) expressed beliefs are influenced by the availability 
of a risk perception in public discourse because people are motivated for reputational reasons to 
conform; 5) there are actors, organizational or individual, who knowingly exploit the availability 
effect to raise or lower societal risk perceptions. Kuran and Sunstein provide a compelling 
argument for these elements. They describe how a focus on purely informational effects (found 
in some parts of the prior literature) is invariably under-socialised, neglecting the way in which 
people have to manage social reputations; and how a focus on purely reputational effects is over-
socialised, neglecting the rationality of relying on social discourse for information about a risk 
The availability of a risk perception exists in some social network in which N agents are 
connected according to some graph G by bi-directional links such that Gij = 1 if i and j are social 
neighbours but 0 otherwise. We fix this network for the rest of the analysis, which seems 
reasonable in the context of an individual risk issue, but is clearly a simplification of a reality in 
which unacquainted individuals can be brought together in dealing with a common threat. Each 
agent i has an espoused (that is, internal) belief, or not, in some proposition in public discourse, 
besp,i  {0, 1}, and an expressed belief, bexp,i  {0, 1}. For example, in the BSE crisis (Beck et al, 
2005) the central risk proposition was that a disease crossed the species barrier from cattle to 
human. In the UK MMR triple vaccine crisis (Stroud, 2005) the risk proposition was that the 
vaccine caused autism. The defining aspect of the availability heuristic (Tversky and 
Kahnemann, 1973) is that the probability of a proposition is estimated by its availability, so at 
any given time t  at which i is active its belief is a function of the proportion qi of its social 
neighbours expressing that belief, qi = (j | Gij = 1 bexp,j) / |{ j | Gij = 1}|. 
 Kuran and Sunstein (1999) link espoused beliefs to the informational role of risk 
communications and expressed beliefs to the reputational role. Internal beliefs about the truth of 
some hazard are based on the information contained in public discourse. But expressed beliefs 














those around them. At around the same time that Kuran and Sunstein’s work emerged another 
study, from Gardner and Kleinman (2000), showed that informational and reputational motives 
led to different functional forms of response. Informational motives made the likelihood of 
influence a concave function of how widely an idea was accepted among a local reference group. 
Reputational motives made it a convex function. It therefore becomes natural to model the 
availability effect in this way. Given some positive parameter C we simply update i’s beliefs 
after a discrete time interval to besp,i (t + 1) = 1 with probability qi(t)
1/C 
and bexp,i (t + 1) = 1 with 
probability qi(t)
C 
 and otherwise set them to zero. 
This heuristic process of belief updating reflects the fact that agents are characteristically 
adaptive rather than rational, given their cognitive limitations (Doran et al, 1994), and follow 
simple procedures when giving and receiving influence (Axelrod, 1997: 153). The basic notion 
that individuals are willing to set aside what beliefs they formerly had in favour of those received 
from social interaction underlies thinking about information cascades that has gone on for some 
time: Kuran and Sunstein cite a number of earlier studies, including the commonly-cited work of 
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al (1998).  In practice, the availability effect is not 
determinate. It will vary between issues and individuals, and quite probably within individuals 
from one time to another. And individuals may sometimes misperceive the expressed beliefs of 
others, given the ambiguity of natural language and limited bandwidth of human 
communications – especially when conducted via social media. It is therefore necessary to 
incorporate noise in the belief updating process, for example by switching from belief to non-
belief or vice versa at random with some relatively small probability . 
Kuran and Sunstein also make an important point about the existence of ‘availability 
entrepreneurs’. Certain agents have incentives to amplify or attenuate risk in public discourse. 
Providers of protective products and services, for instance, may benefit from a widespread belief 
in some hazard, whereas providers of products and services that put people at risk may benefit 
from an attenuated hazard perception. In a detailed case study, Lofstedt (2008) clearly portrays 
an organizational actor (a cancer research foundation) as an availability entrepreneur, 
deliberately raising the availability of a specific hazard (the carcinogenic effects of aspartame) in 
the public discourse. The modelling of this requires that certain agents can spontaneously 
develop expressed beliefs, rather than simply express beliefs determined by availability. It also 














general representation of this is – for every agent – to set some low probability Q with which it 
spontaneously has an expressed belief value, which is 1 or 0 with equal probability. The 
entrepreneur’s deliberately engineered social influence can then be represented in various ways. 
Perhaps most simply, availability in all interactions is biased by the entrepreneur’s spontaneous 
expressed belief value by taking a mean of the social neighbourhood availability qi with the 
entrepreneur’s expressed belief in the S subsequent social interactions, where S is a model 
constant. Much more complex representations of availability entrepreneurship can readily be 
envisaged – for example, allowing entrepreneurs to search in the social network for highly 
connected hubs and influence their expressed beliefs. But in this simple form Figure 1 illustrates 
the agent’s decision rules, at this point, using pseudocode.   
------------------ 
Figure 1 here 
------------------ 
The outcome of this representation, before a more meaningful level of complexity is introduced, 
is indicated in Figure 2 by two sample traces from a simulation of 1 000 agents of the proportion 
believing in a risk proposition over 20 000 model periods, in each of which one agent is selected 
at random with equal probability for activation. The relevant population will vary from case to 
case, depending on the specificity and localisation of the risk event in question. Responses to 
even relatively global crises such as the BSE outbreaks were sometimes studied as socially local 
phenomena in small networks (Lehmkuhl, 2008). Using relatively small numbers also helps 
avoid ‘epistemic opacity’ (Miller, 2015). And there is some evidence that important emergent 
behaviours appear insensitive to network size (Santos and Pacheco, 2005). But modelling a 
particular situation will require a specific judgment of the appropriate N. The black line shows 
the time series of mean espoused beliefs, and the grey line that of expressed beliefs. Two 
successive runs of the model with identical parameters are shown in the upper and lower parts of 
the Figure, indicating the extent to which the belief trajectories are path dependent. For the agent 
network structure we use a scale-free network with a power law distribution of link numbers k in 
which the number of nodes with k links is proportional to k
-
. This seems to apply to many actual 
networks of social contacts, in which  generally lies in the range of 2 to 3 (Santos and Pacheco, 
2005; Barabasi, 2009). At t = 0, agents are randomly assigned an espoused belief of 1 with some 














otherwise 0.  
------------------ 
Figure 2 here 
------------------ 
The availability mechanism specified so far produces growth in risk perception up to some quite 
high, but not saturated level with very little distinction between expressed and espoused beliefs. 
The process shows some drift with fairly well-defined turning points. Parameter values are C = 




4  Ripple effects and the endogeneity of behaviour 
 
A central element of Kasperson et al’s (1988) social risk amplification framework is that social 
actors act on their perceptions of risk. These actions are themselves observed by other social 
actors, and responded to. Behaviour is the product of amplified risk perceptions and it 
simultaneously shapes those perceptions. For example, in relation to risks such as pharmaceutical 
and food contamination (Wolnik et al, 1984; Ingelfinger, 2008), heightened risk perception 
typically reduces consumption, and so reduces exposure, the reported prevalence of harm, and 
therefore subsequent perception. Liu et al’s (1998) study of a milk contamination crisis showed 
an obvious connection between heightened risk perception and reduced consumption. If the risk 
is to the availability of a commodity, rather than its contamination, heightened risk perception 
might increase or bring forward consumption, and ultimately magnify perception. But in the 
example that follows we concentrate on the first case.  
Although we refer to the risk bearer’s exposure path as being ‘consumption’ it is really 
any discretionary aspect of the risk bearer’s behaviour that shapes the risk. Then what we call 
consumption is most simply another binary variable ci {0, 1}, equated with the negation of 
internal belief, ci = 1 – besp,i , such that if i believes in some hazard it does not consume, but 
otherwise does consume. Consumption in a population is, to varying degrees, observable by the 
same population. In the case of major risk events, global consumption levels are widely reported 














SARS crisis (Brahmbhatt and Dutta, 2008). In the case of more minor events, individuals may 
only observe consumption behaviours in their direct social network. When general reports are 
available, individuals will be able to estimate the mean public consumption i [1, N] ci / N, and 
thereby the mean espoused belief. Probably the most parsimonious model of how this affects 
perception is then to revise an individual’s espoused beliefs (and its state of consumption) if the 
discrepancy between the mean public consumption and its current espoused belief (0 or 1) 
exceeds some threshold T, a model constant. Thus: 
besp,i (t + 1) = 0 if besp,i (t) – (j[1, N]  (1 – cesp,j(t))) / N > T;  
besp,i (t + 1) = 1 if (j[1, N]  (1 – cesp,j (t))) / N – besp,i (t) > T;  
besp,i (t + 1) = besp,i (t) otherwise.  
Figure 3 illustrates the additional pseudocode.  
------------------ 
Figure 3 here 
------------------ 
Example traces are shown in Figure 4 in which T = 0.5 and the other parameters set at previous 
values. The main effect is to separate the espoused and expressed beliefs more clearly in value.  
------------------ 
Figure 4 here 
------------------ 
This way of representing the effect of observed behaviour on perception is simplistic in various 
aspects. For example, we have taken no account of the way in which people might avoid 
inconsistency between expressed beliefs and consumption behaviour. It therefore illustrates only 
one way of making the commitment to incorporating the perception-behaviour link in a risk 
amplification model. 
 
5  Risk principals, news and the endogeneity of communication 
Probably in all risk cases there will be one or more risk principals. These are the social actors, 
generally organizations, responsible for a risk. Often they include producers of good and services 














processing installations, disease outbreaks in healthcare facilities and so on. They may well also 
include state agencies that regulate such producers and carry some moral if not causal 
responsibility. The members of a society are clearly influenced in their risk beliefs not only by 
their peers but also by such risk principals.  
 Risk principals are, generally, either sources or users of expert, objective risk assessment 
– typically estimating the probability of harm given consumption,   [0, 1]. This might be the 
probability of fatality per unit of consumption (for example 1 kg of contaminated foodstuff, or 
period of exposure to an air-borne disease, or a single inoculation). In most cases there will be 
some non-zero background level of hazard, normal, but during a crisis (for example a food 
contamination event, or disease outbreak) lasting for some period tinitiation to tresumption some 
heightened level, raised. In complex risk issues, the group of experts may well be ill-defined, 
consisting of independent academics, individuals employed by state regulatory agencies and 
those employed by commercial interests. There is evidence that expert risk beliefs converge with 
increasing inter-communication (Muter et al, 2013) but clearly in any particular case there may 
be no consensus. In what follows we assume a single, consensual expert assessment. In some 
contexts, however, a better approach might well be a more socialised model of the expert 
process. 
The public are not exposed to expert risk assessment continually, and perhaps the 
simplest representation of the timing of risk communication is that it is triggered when there is a 
discrepancy greater than some threshold D between the harm probability and the probability a 
member of the public has a positive expressed belief i[1, N]   bexp,i / N, for example as indicated 
by public surveys. Again, it is possible to represent this in quite different ways, but some 
commitment needs to be made to how risk communications from risk principals are triggered. 
However, it is unlikely that general members of the public receive expert estimates in an 
unmoderated form. We made the point earlier that the way in which actor A communicating 
about a risk to actor B does so with some expectation of whether B is under- or over-sensitive to 
communications from A. We described how Rayner's (1988) early critique of social risk 
amplification, and a later revision of the framework (Busby and Duckett, 2012), requires that we 
think of social actors as deciding how to interpret risk messages based on their expectations 














correct for others’ expected distortions (Petts and Niemeyer, 2004; Frewer, 2004; Renn and 
Levine, 1991). This involves actors engaged in ‘theory of mind’ (for example De Weerd et al, 
2013): holding representations of what is in the mind of other actors when interpreting what they 
hear from them. A commitment therefore has to be made in any modelling process to what these 
theories of mind are, and how they influence agents’ communicative actions.  
The simplest possible approach is to assume that public actors believe that a risk 
principal, in the context of a specific type of belief, has a fixed level of bias in its 
communications, principal, where principal = 0.5 indicates neutrality, 1 indicates maximal 
exaggeration, and 0 maximal understatement of risk. Similarly a risk principal attributes a fixed 
bias public to the public as a group. Putting the principal constant assumes that actors learn their 
theories of mind from one crisis to another, rather than within the course of a specific crisis. For 
the principal a basic decision rule about what to communicate is to say that if (i[1, N]  bexp,i (t)/ 
N -  ) is positive (the public as a group are over-stating the risk) and public > 0.5 (they are 
normally expected to do so), the communication m after some delay A should be m(t + A) = 0, 
telling the public there is nothing to worry about. If (i[1, N]  bexp,i (t) / N -   ) is negative (the 
public are under-stating the risk) and public < 0.5 (they normally do so) the communication m(t + 
A) = 1, telling them there is something to worry about. But if (i[1, N]  bexp,i / N -   ) is positive 
and public < 0.5 there should be some non-zero probability that the communication m = 1, rather 
than 0, because it is generally believed the public under-estimate even though, on this occasion, 
it appears to be exaggerating. The closer the value of public to 0 the more it under-estimates, so 
probability(m(t + A)  = 1) = 0.5 - public in this case. Similarly, if (i[1, N]  bexp,i (t) / N -   ) < 0 
and public > 0.5, probability(m(t + A)  = 0) = public - 0.5.  
The risk communication m is broadcast to the public agents as ‘news’. An agent has a 
finite probability that it will be influenced by the news. This probability is a function of 
individual susceptibility, i   [0, 1], a quantity that is fixed for a given agent but randomly 
endowed. News is persistent, and there can be some difference in its age news when attended to 
by different agents, and it is reasonable to discount it by some universal factor , so that the 
















the most recent item of news is considered by a public agent. 
Given this probability that a public agent pays attention to the news, it needs to be given 
some rule for interpreting communications from the risk principal. For instance, if besp,i(t) = 0 = 
m(t), or if besp,i(t) = 1 = m(t), the agent’s current belief and the news are consistent so it should 
retain its current belief. But if besp,i = 0 and m = 1 then, if also principal > 0.5, the principal tends 
to amplify so the communication that the belief is true is simply a manifestation of this bias, 
indicating that the agent’s posterior  belief should definitely stay at zero. But if principal < 0.5, the 
principal tends to attenuate and this gives strength to the news that the belief is true. So with 
some finite probability 0.5 - principal the agent should update its belief to 1. If besp,i = 1 and m = 0 
then, if also principal < 0.5, the principal tends to attenuate and the communication is simply a 
manifestation of this bias, indicating that the agent’s posterior  belief should definitely stay at 1. 
But if principal > 0.5, the principal tends to amplify so it seems reasonable to follow its 
communication stating that the belief is false with some probability principal – 0.5.  
Figure 5 shows the pseudo-code for the risk communications processes. It seems likely 
that in practice these theories of mind will be highly context specific, varying between actors and 
situations, because they are a product of individual histories. The main point is that some kind of 
commitment has to be made to a mechanism describing how people adjust for their 
preconceptions about other people when acting on and forming their communications.  
------------------ 
Figure 5 here 
------------------ 
Figure 6 shows a typical trace with D = 0.1, A = 100, and the operative risk levels raised 
andnormal set at 0.8 and 0.01 with tinitiation = 10 000 and tresumption = 13 000. The attributed biases 
public and principal are 0.9 and 0.1. The figure shows the public expressed value on the black 
trace, the amplification of the actual risk level in mid-grey (showing mostly attenuation in this 
case), and the density of changes in belief in light grey. The change density is the proportion of 
the population changing either or both of their expressed and espoused beliefs within each 10 
cycle period of the model. As expected, belief changes occurred much more frequently around 
the change of the objective risk change, but also occurred from endogenous activity – at 
















Figure 6 here 
------------------ 
 
6  Model validity and sensitivity 
 
6.1 Microvalidity 
A general view (Moss and Edmonds, 2005; Midgley et al, 2007) is that the validation of agent 
based models is essentially of two kinds: micro, the validation of the component assumptions 
and decision rules, and macro, the validation of the outcomes that emerge in the model’s 
behaviour. But as Midgley et al (2007) argue such validation is inherently difficult, given the 
heterogeneity of agents and the shaping of behaviour at the macro level by interaction at the 
micro level. They suggest that ‘even the “simple” step of establishing face validity may itself be 
a significant challenge’. In Table 1 we summarise the elements on which Sections 3, 4 and 5 
were based. The table does not list all the work we draw in section 3, and it obscures the fact that 
some of the key contributions – such as Kuran and Sunstein’s (1999) – themselves draw on other 
research, most of it empirical. In some ways this is beneficial, as it helps synthesise and interpret 
prior work. Its limitation is that it creates more distance between original empirical work and the 
modelling that is ultimately based on it. In all cases the evidence lacks 1) support for specific 
functional forms, and 2) indication of specific values for model parameters. A large part of the 
problem is context specificity: as the table indicates, the various studies arise in various, quite 
different contexts.  
---------------- 
Table 1 here 
---------------- 
However, modelling only where calibrating data exist would unduly restrict the extent to which 
modelling could contribute to theory development (Miller, 2015). Part of its value is to identify 
the empirical research needed on social constants, and to show what decision makers need to 
know about specific, contextual parameters in order to understand the potential for social risk 
amplification in specific cases. The effort devoted to measuring such parameters can be guided 














the mean discrepancy over time between objective risk level and the mean public expressed 
belief during the period indicated on the traces in previous figures (in which there is a single 
episode of an increased objective risk level). This discrepancy is expressed instantaneously as a 
probability, with values greater than 0.5 indicating amplification and less than 0.5 attenuation, 
Y(t) = 0.5 + 0.5 ((i[1, N]  bexp,i (t)) / N  -   ). Ford and Flynn (2005) suggest using the simple 
product moment correlation between model outcome and model constants to measure the 
relevance of each constant’s role, so we randomly sample the constants 100 times from their 
plausible ranges, assuming uniform distributions for each, and run the model 10 times for each 
sample. The question of how to establish plausible ranges for model constants is problematic, 
and ultimately subjective. The table suggests that in the current setup the outcomes are 
insensitive to the network parameter (the exponent defining the link degree distribution). They 
are moderately sensitive to specific parameters defining the social context, notably the ‘noise’ or 
probability of random changes in belief, and to the bias attributed to the public by a 
communicating risk principal.  
---------------- 




The basis for macro-validity needs to be empirical time series of risk perceptions, risk responses 
or indications of risk beliefs in social groups, in response to identifiable risk events of societal 
significance. What we know from the literature is that such time series can exhibit very different 
forms, with few qualitative features in common. Deploying a model in practice, to support 
decisions in the course of specific risk episodes, requires a comparison of model output with 
observations in episodes that are obviously similar in some relevant way.  
Loewenstein and Mather’s (1990) empirical work records time series of public concern in 
a variety of different issues, all of which they regard as societally significant risks. Table 4 
summarises the measures used and the qualitative features of these series, in our words. All the 
issues show measures of concern that fluctuate substantially more than the underlying, objective 
conditions – sometimes to extreme degrees. But the qualitative features vary substantially across 














work is now dated, given changes in social communication and interaction. The measures of 
concern are, in many cases, only indirectly connected with the extent of some risk belief in a 
society. The variety in patterns of response for different issues is striking, however.  
---------------- 
Table 3 here 
---------------- 
It is notable that there are no flat peaks in Loewenstein and Mather’s (1990) data, nor in those of 
Chung (2011) – nor in those of our simple simulation model. The exogenous threat takes the 
form of a finite impulse, and so has a rectangular profile, but the dynamics of the social response 
mean that risk beliefs grow toward a peak, sometimes repeated, before immediately declining. 
Similarly, in the absence of threat the processes show a continual drift, with turning points. 
Klimek et al (2011) also found evidence for public attention more commonly arising for 
endogenous reasons than in response to a clear exogenous event. And Midden and Verplanken 
(1990) found that risk perceptions around nuclear power showed considerable instability over 
time. 
A more recent empirical study of the dynamics of risk perceptions around a pandemic 
influenza outbreak (Ibuka et al, 2010) produces a similar indication. Over the survey period, the 
objective incidence of cases increased monotonically. But two measures of aggregate risk 
perception show substantial instability. The former broadly looks like ‘noise’ – an aperiodic, low 
amplitude, apparently random movement; the latter looks more like ‘instability’ – movements of 
large amplitude with an approximate periodicity. Generally, though, longitudinal data on risk 
perception is hard to come by. And, because typically it only covers a period in which some 
crisis is established, it cannot show the dynamics prior to an exogenous change in risk. A good 
example is Lau et al’s (2003) study during the SARS outbreak, which was used as an empirical 
comparison for a system dynamics model of social risk amplification (Busby and Onggo, 2012). 
It shows a clear peak, but the sparsity of observations and the short window of data collection 
preclude the possibility of showing the kind of endogenous fluctuation in risk perception that our 
model indicates.  
Finally, Moss and Edmonds (2005) argue that it is such turning points in time series, 
unpredictably clustered volatility, and consequent leptokurtosis, that appears beyond the reach of 














phenomena, and arises because agents are socially embedded and have ‘meta-stable’ decision 
rules that only respond when thresholds are crossed. Figure 7 shows the distribution of 
proportional period-by-period changes in the mean public espoused risk belief from a single 
simulation with modal parameter values, for windows of 10 model ‘ticks’, (b(t + 10) – b(t))/b(t + 
10). It clearly shows strong leptokurtosis. The value of excess kurtosis (defined in terms of 
fourth and second central moments, 4 and 2, as 4/2
2
 – 3) is 815, which is very high. 
----------------- 
Figure 7 here 
----------------- 
Clearly, the possibilities for validation of any specific model of social risk response are limited. 
But this reflects the state of our knowledge generally about the subject in question. The model 
produces certain features that simply have not been examined empirically, despite their potential 
theoretical interest, such as the drift in a population’s mean belief that occurs for internal, 
systemic reasons rather than as a result of external signals or events.  
 
7  Discussion and conclusion 
7.1  The main implications 
The outcomes of the modelling and simulation point to the need to update our theorising about 
the social amplification of risk in two main ways. First, the simple finding that dynamics are 
interesting matters to theory. Amplification is not a simple case of constant multiplication of 
some risk level over time, even when that risk level is constant. Past work (with the exception of 
the systems dynamics studies of Burns and Slovic (2007), and Busby and Onggo (2013)) has said 
little about dynamics. The original framework (Kasperson et al, 1988) points to ‘ripple effects’ 
that by definition follow some initiating risk event, but pays little attention to how much 
amplification fluctuates over a crisis, to what extent it pre-figures it, and to what degree there is 
an aftermath. Our simulation shows one possible pattern, and the simple, underlying structure of 
agents interacting through availability-based rules provides a mechanism that can be assimilated 
in the theory of social risk amplification. 
 The internally-produced change evident in the simulation of social risk response also 
matters. Endogenous peaks in the simulation are not as large as peaks that follow crises in which 














and would create a material consequence for a risk manager, whether economic or political. The 
social amplification of risk literature does not deal with this, perhaps because the original 
framework (Kasperson et al, 1988) stresses the way in which social risk amplification is initiated 
by some ‘risk event’. Our theory of social risk amplification needs updating to allow for the 
possibility of a public anxiety that has no basis in some specific, objective occurrence. Such a 
proposition is almost impossible to confirm in practice, because in a complex society there is 
always some event occurring near the start of some growth of public concern that, in hindsight, 
can be claimed as its trigger. But neither is there any theoretical justification in assuming the 
opposite: that an identifiable event is necessarily required for an acute growth in social concern 
about some risk.  
 The way to revise theory to take account of such outcomes is to incorporate the 
commitments that have had to be made in the basic model proposed here. These commitments 
may need to be made differently in different contexts, reflecting the diversity of outcomes found, 
for example, by Loewenstein and Mather (1990). Such commitments include specific 
mechanisms of interaction, the relationship between espoused and expressed beliefs, and the role 
of informational and reputational motivations during interactions (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). 
They include processes of deliberate distortion (Lofstedt, 2008; Busby and Duckett, 2012). And 
they include some representation of theory of mind, in which observers of risk responses base 
their own responses not only on the responses they observe but the models they have of those 
producing such responses. 
 It is also worth commenting on the connection between the basic notion of social risk 
amplification and the dissemination of warnings – as also analysed in the literature with agent 
based models (Nagarajan et al, 2012). Warning dissemination through peer networks as well as 
broadcast channels is an important mechanism not just for communicating information but also 
exerting influence, given limited compliance with official warnings. Zechman’s (2011) model of 
water contamination events provides an example. The notion of risk amplification is that 
dissemination does not occur without distortion of some initial risk signal. But, equally, 
distortion does not occur without dissemination. So although social amplification can be seen as 
undesirable and problematic for risk managers it also achieves a dissemination of risk 
understanding that is often desirable if not vital in certain risk events, particularly if large-scale 














public risk beliefs, and achieving active public response to risks – are faced by risk managers as 
aggregate effects across a population. But they are produced by individual agents interacting 
with one another and exchanging information about something that is exogenous to each of them 
yet endogenous to the population of which they are members. Agent-based modelling is logically 
central to our understanding of both facets of social responses to danger: productive 
dissemination and unproductive distortion. 
 
7.2 The intended contribution 
The intended contribution is to make the understanding of social risk amplification more precise 
and therefore more operational – both as a basis for more directed empirical work and as a basis 
for theorising about what we mean by social risk amplification. As Miller (2015) has recently 
argued, a critical realist view calls for explanations in terms of underlying mechanisms, and 
agent-based modelling fundamentally represents the interaction of social actors, rather than 
variables, providing a process perspective rather than a variance perspective. An agent-based 
model such as ours explains social risk amplification as a mechanism, and the simulation of that 
mechanism allows us then to identify interesting consequences that have so far received little 
attention. The model is not intended to be definitive, but to show how some key elements of 
social risk responses can be represented: 
1. The endogeneity of risk observation. Most risks of societal significance are not experienced 
or observed physically by most people: most people rely on other people, and the beliefs they 
express. 
2. The endogeneity of risk behaviour. Risk beliefs shape risk behaviours (such as withdrawing 
from consumption of activities or products that expose people to the risk in question), and 
behaviours are observed, so shape risk beliefs. 
3. The endogeneity of risk communication. Actors receive communications that have been 
adjusted or moderated to reflect the communicator’s experiences and expectations about 
those communicated to, and communications received influence communications 
subsequently made. 
We showed simple ways in which these elements can be represented, drawing particularly on 
Kuran and Sunstein’s (1999) well-developed notion of availability cascades, itself built on more 














This gives insight into the mechanisms that risk managers dealing with public responses have to 
deal with, and indicate the range of outcomes they should be prepared for. 
 
7.3  Some limitations 
There are some obvious limitations of the approach taken here. First, there are important types of 
actor and related social processes that have been omitted from the model. The most obvious is 
the role of the media, quite often referred to in the literature (for example Petts and Niemeyer, 
2004), and often exploited by availability entrepreneurs – as demonstrated by Bakir (2005). 
Second, the model does not deal with homophily, the affinity of individuals within groups, and 
related issues such as cultural polarisation (for example Flache and Macy, 2011). The literature 
on cultural risk selection (for example Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) suggests that this is an 
important next step in developing the model. And the model has concentrated on the 
representation of single issues. Any real society has to come to terms with many risk issues that 
come into prominence at broadly the same time, making it important to understand how public 
anxiety can be attenuated simply through distraction. There were also limitations in verification 
and validation. As we discussed, these strongly limit any claims that can be made about the 
outcomes from the simulation, and clearly indicate that making models of this kind operational 
to support managerial practice or policy making has to involve investigation of what happens in 
specific contexts. Relying on generalised models with tentative parameters could be highly 
misleading. 
 Finally, there are of problems in the use of agent based computational modelling 
generally. Macy and Willer (2002) argue that ‘Computer simulation is more tractable (but less 
generalizable) than mathematical modelling and more rigorous (but less nuanced) than natural 
language’. In terms of representational richness and fidelity, on the one hand, and transparency, 
on the other, it is a half-way house and does not avoid the need for more formal treatments of 
social risk amplification. But it nonetheless represents a reasonable direction for representing 
amplification more precisely, and working out the consequences of such a representation. It 
broadly avoids falling into the ‘trap of verisimilitude’ (Doran and Gilbert, 1994) – of trying to 
say too much about the world – or the ‘trap of tractability’ – saying too little in order to be 
analytical. And it helps to enhance our explanatory spaces. If we were asked to explain a peak in 














some event in the world, that could cause such an outcome. But an equally plausible alternative 
is that peaks and drift come from the structures and mechanisms of social observation and 
reaction alone. 
 
List of notation 
 
G Non-directed graph s.t. Gij = 1 if agent i and agent j are neighbours, else 0 
N Number of public agents 
besp,i(t), bexp,i(t) Agent i’s espoused (private) and expressed (public) beliefs at time t 
qi Fraction of agent i's neighbours expressing a belief 
 Probability of random belief switching when an agent active 
C Exponent determining probability of influence from belief availability 
Q Spontaneous adoption of belief as an availability entrepreneur 
S Number of continuing interactions of availability entrepreneur’s influence 
 Exponent defining distribution of link degrees in network 
ci(t) Consumption of agent i at t 
T Margin at which consumption observation revises a belief 
(t) Objective risk level at t 
D Margin at which risk principal communicates 
principal, public Bias in expressed risk attributed to risk principal and public  
 Lag before communication from risk principal 
i   Agent i’s susceptibility to influence by risk principal’s communication 
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Table 1: Micro-validating use of evidence for model elements  
 
 Decision rule or model 
assumption 
Validating evidence or 
proposition 
Evidence type Context 
Model-wide Social interaction shapes risk 
perception 
Scherer & Cho (2003) Empirical Hazardous 
waste 
  Muter et al (2013) Empirical Wildlife risk 
  Kohler et al (2007) Empirical HIV/AIDS 
 Non-linearity in social 
amplification processes 
Burns & Slovic (2007)  Model Terrorism 




 Risk perceiver heterogeneity Marris et al (1997) Empirical Multiple (locale 
specific) 
  Langford et al (1999) Empirical Multiple 
  Sjoeberg (2000) Empirical Radiation 
 Social networks have small 
world properties 






Social availability drives risk 
perception 
Kuran & Sunstein (1999) General 
synthesis 
Multiple 
 Learning/legitimation effects 
show diminishing/increasing 
returns to peer group size  





Heightened perception reduces 
consumption and exposure 
Liu et al (1998) Empirical Food 
contamination 
  Brahmbhatt & Dutta (2008) Empirical SARS 









Perceiver expects distortion in 
risk communications 
Petts & Niemeyer (2004) Empirical Vaccination 
  Busby & Duckett (2012) Empirical Zoonotic 
disease 
  Frewer (2004) General All 
  Frewer et al (2003) Empirical GM foods 


















Table 2: Product moment correlations between mean discrepancy and model constants 
 




Convexity factor, C 1.2 – 4.0 0.28** 
Noise level, n 0.001 – 0.1 0.48** 
Entrepreneur probability, Q 0.0001 – 0.001 0.30** 
Entrepreneur legacy period, S 100 – 700 0.14* 
Consumption revision gap, T 0.2 – 0.7 -0.08 
Communication triggering margin, D 0.05 – 0.2 -0.03 
Attributed principal’s bias, principal 0.01 – 0.9 -0.11 
Attributed public bias, public 0.01 – 0.9 -0.46** 
 News discount factor,  0.01 – 0.3 -0.04 





2 - 3 -0.01 
 















Table 3: Risk response patterns found by Loewenstein & Mather (1990) 
 
Risk issue Proxy measure of concern Qualitative pattern in time series 
AIDS Frequency of national news 
articles 
High frequency periodicity ≈ 3 months 
Double peak on smoothed trend 
Objective incidence monotonically rising and initially 
lagging the public response 
Crime General social survey % 
respondents afraid to walk at 
night 
Single peak with non-periodic non-monotonic 
movements 
Objective incidence closely similar but smoothed and 
leading by ≈ 1 year 
Drink driving Difference between number of 
drink driving groups founded 
and disbanded 
Single peak, width ≈ 7 years 
Objective incidence closely similar but smoothed and 
leading by ≈ 1 year 
Herpes Frequency of national news 
articles 
Extreme-amplitude single peak with small-amplitude 
non-periodic non-monotonic movements 
Objective incidence closely similar without the extreme 
peak and lagging by ≈ 1 year 
Price inflation Opinion poll % respondents 
citing inflation as the primary 
problem 
Double peak with non-periodic non-monotonic 
movements 
Objective incidence closely similar in most periods 
Un- 
employment 
Opinion poll % respondents 
citing unemployment as the 
primary problem 
Multiple non-periodic peaks 
Objective incidence closely similar  
Polio Frequency of news articles in a 
specific outlet 
Low frequency periodicity ≈ 4 years  
Objective incidence of similar periodicity with both close 
similarity and extreme difference at different times 
Teenage 
suicide 
Frequency of national news 
articles 
Extreme-amplitude single peak with small-amplitude 
non-periodic non-monotonic movements 
Objective incidence similar with small monotonic trend 
Teenage 
illegitimacy 
Frequency of news articles in a 
specific outlet 
Low frequency periodicity ≈ 6 years  















































//find mean of neighbour beliefs 
beliefAvailability = meanOverNeighbours(expressedBelief) 
//determine if this agent is to be an availability entrepreneur 
with (EntrepreneurshipProbability) 
 with (SpontaneousTrueProbability) entrepreneurBias = 1 else entrepreneurBias = 0 
 entrepreneurBiasTransactions = 0 
//determine if availability entrepreneurship is still active  
if (entrepreneurBiasTransactions < entrepreneurBiasTransactionLimit)  
probabilityOfExpressedBelief = meanOf(beliefAvailability^EffectConvexity, entrepreneurBias) 
probabilityOfEspousedBelief = meanOf(beliefAvailability^(1/EffectConvexity), entrepreneurBias) 
entrepreneurBiasTransactions++ 
else 
 probabilityOfExpressedBelief = beliefAvailability^EffectConvexity 
 probabilityOfEspousedBelief = beliefAvailability^(1/EffectConvexity) 
with (probabilityOfExpressedBelief) expressedBelief = 1 else expressedBelief = 0 
with (probabilityOfEspousedBelief) espousedBelief = 1 else espousedBelief = 0 
 
with (NoiseProbability)  
 expressedBelief = ~expressedBelief 















Figure 2:  Two sample traces of proportion of population having espoused (black line) and 


































observedPublicConsumption = meanOverAllAgents(espousedBelief); 
if (espousedBelief – observedPublicConsumption > reconsiderationThreshold) 
 espousedBelief = 0 
else if (observedPublicConsumption – espousedBelief > reconsiderationThreshold) 




































































publicDiscrepancy = meanOverAgents(expressedBelief) - objectiveRisk 
if (|publicDiscrepancy| > communicationThreshold)  
 if (publicDiscrepancy > 0) 
  //definitely communicate belief to be false if public is exaggerating risk as usual 
  if (amplificationOfPublic > 0.5) then probabilityOfTrue = 0 
  else probabilityOfTrue = amplificationOfPublic – 0.5 
 else  
  //definitely communicate belief to be true if public is under-estimating risk as usual 
  if (amplificationOfPublic < 0.5) then probabilityOfTrue = 1 
  else probabilityOfTrue = 0.5 – amplificationOfPublic 
 with (probabilityOfTrue) communicationContent = 1.0 





newsAttentionProbability = agentSusceptibility*(1 + newsDiscountRate)^newsAge 
with (newsAttentionProbability) 
 if (existsCommunication(communicationContent) && espousedBelief ≠ communicationContent) 
  //retain belief to be false if principal simply confirming a bias to amplify 
  if (espousedBelief == 0 and communicationContent == 1) 
   if (amplificationOfPrincipal > 0.5) then probabilityOfTrue = 0.0; 
   else probabilityOfTrue = 0.5 - amplificationOfPrincipal; 
  //retain belief to be true if principal confirming a bias to attenuate 
  else if (espousedBelief == 1 and communicationContent == 0) 
   if (amplificationOfPrincipal < 0.5) then probabilityOfTrue = 1.0; 
   else probabilityOfTrue = 1.5 - amplificationOfPrincipal; 

































Figure 7: Distribution of fractional period-by-period changes in mean espoused risk beliefs 
 
 
 
 
